You are here: / / DEFENDANT CAR DEALERSHIP OWNED THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF, ITS SALESMAN,...
, , ,

DEFENDANT CAR DEALERSHIP OWNED THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF, ITS SALESMAN, WAS INJURED DURING A TEST DRIVE; THE DEALERSHIP, AS PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE AS THE OWNER OF THE CAR UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant Paddock Chevrolet was immune from suit by its employee in this traffic accident case. Plaintiff, a salesman for Paddock, was a passenger in a car owned by Paddock which was being test-driven at the time of the accident. The court noted that the Workers’ Compensation Law protected Paddock from vicarious liability as the owner of the car pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law:

Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 provides that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed by [section 10] shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, . . . or any person otherwise entitled to recover damages, contribution or indemnity, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death or liability arising therefrom . . .” We thus agree with Paddock that plaintiff’s claims against it are barred.

Paddock correctly contends that New York has rejected the “dual capacity” doctrine … , rendering it irrelevant whether the amended complaint and cross claims asserted against Paddock were based on its status as plaintiff’s employer or its status as the owner of the vehicle who is vicariously liable for the negligence of a nonemployee driver under Vehicle and Traffic Law … . Mansour v Paddock Chevrolet, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 05190, Fourth Dept 10-1-21

 

You might also like
ARBITRATOR EXCEEDED HIS POWERS BY REFUSING TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AWARD PROPERLY VACATED.
DEC CONTRACTORS HAD THE RIGHT TO ENTER PROPERTY TO TEST FOR GASOLINE CONTAMINATION WITHOUT SIGNING THE PROPERTY OWNER’S ACCESS AGREEMENT, BECAUSE ONLY A CHANGE IN FORM WAS REQUIRED, THE DEC’S ACTION WAS CONVERTED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION 4TH DEPT.
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT’S EXPERT’S OPINION THAT NERVE DAMAGE WAS NOT THE RESULT OF DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF RENTED DEFENDANT’S COTTAGE AND WAS INJURED WHEN THE DECK COLLAPSED; PLAINTIFF’S CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON RES IPSA LQUITUR AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR WHO CONSTRUCTED THE DECK SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT; A PROPERTY OWNER HAS A NONDELEGABLE DUTY TO THE PUBLIC TO KEEP THE PREMISES SAFE, AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT A PROPERTY OWNER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF STRUCK BY A LACROSSE BALL THROWN BY A COACH DURING PRACTICE, THE ACTION WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY EITHER THE SIGNED WAIVER OR THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (FOURTH DEPT).
POLICE REPORT WAS NOT AUTHENTICATED AND WAS NOT SUBMITTED IN ADMISSIBLE FORM, THEREFORE IT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS CAR-BICYCLE ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF DID NOT ELIMINATE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER SHE WAS COMPARATIVELY NEGLIGENT IN NOT SEEING WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN (FOURTH DEPT).
THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD FOR REFILING A COMPLAINT AFTER DISMISSAL (CPLR 205(A)) BEGAN TO RUN ONLY WHEN THE APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO VACATE THE DISMISSAL WAS EXHAUSTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THERE WAS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE, THEREFORE NEW YORK LAW APPLIES AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR A CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT NURSING HOME SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND IN... DEFENDANT TENANT CLOSED ITS BUSINESS AND ABANDONED THE LEASED PROPERTY DUE TO...