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PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY’S QUANTUM MERUIT ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS PRECLUDED BY A WRITTEN CONTRACT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court determined plaintiff-attorney’s quantum meruit action for legal services should not have been dismissed. The evidence did not demonstrate the existence of a written contract (which would preclude the quantum meruit action):

“In order to succeed on a cause of action to recover in quantum meruit, the plaintiff must prove (1) the performance of services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they were rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services” … . Recovery under the theory of quantum meruit is not appropriate where an express contract governs the subject matter involved … .

“[A] written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” … . “[A]n unsigned contract may be enforceable, provided there is objective evidence establishing that the parties intended to be bound” … . “In determining whether the parties entered into a contractual agreement and what were its terms, it is necessary to look . . . to the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and deeds” … . Gould v Decolator, Cohen & DiPrisco, LLP, 2021 NY Slip Op 05026, Second Dept 9-22-21

 

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