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PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK AFTER DEFENDANT CROSSING GUARD MOTIONED FOR HIM TO CROSS; THE CROSSING GUARD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED; THE DISSENT WOULD HAVE DENIED THE MOTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, affirmed the grant of the crossing guard’s (Gandolfo’s) and the county’s motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian-vehicle accident case. Defendant Gandolfo had assumed her position in the crosswalk and motioned for infant plaintiff to cross the road when plaintiff was struck by a car driven by Upton. The dissent argued there was some evidence that Gandolfo may have been negligent:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1102 provides that “[n]o person shall fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer or flagperson or other person duly empowered to regulate traffic.” Here, the County defendants … [submitted] transcripts of the deposition testimony of Gandolfo, Upton, and an eyewitness to the accident, which demonstrated that Upton’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Gandolfo testified that, upon seeing the infant at the southern corner of the intersection from her post on the northern corner, she entered the crosswalk, and, upon reaching the middle, raised her stop sign toward traffic traveling east on Montauk Highway, and her gloved hand toward traffic traveling west, checked in both directions two times for approaching vehicles, and seeing none, nodded to the infant to enter the crosswalk. Gandolfo further testified that she heard Upton’s vehicle, which was traveling east on Montauk Highway, before she saw it, and that, despite Gandolfo’s presence in the crosswalk, Upton failed to stop her vehicle, and struck the infant as he had almost reached the middle of the crosswalk. The eyewitness testified that, after dropping her child off at the high school, she was waiting for the infant to walk through the crosswalk before making a right turn onto Montauk Highway, and the crossing guard, dressed in a crossing guard uniform, was in the middle of the crosswalk holding a stop sign, when the infant was struck as he approached the middle of the crosswalk. During her deposition, Upton, who frequently traveled the route where the accident occurred, testified that, prior to striking the infant, she saw Gandolfo in the road, holding up her stop sign, but did not see the infant until after her vehicle struck him. Christopher W. v County of Suffolk, 2021 NY Slip Op 04922, Second Dept 9-1-21

 

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