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THE SMELL OF PCP PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE; DEFENDANT’S APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS CHASTISED FOR FAILURE TO CALL THE COURT’S ATTENTION TO CONTRARY AUTHORITY, UNFOUNDED ASSERTIONS THAT THE APPEAL PRESENTED A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, AND UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF PERJURY, MISCONDUCT AND CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST AN ARRESTING OFFICER (FOURTH DEPT).

THIS OPINION WAS VACATED ON JANUARY 28, 2022, AND REPLACED WITH 2022 NY Slip Op 00560

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, determined the police officer’s (Dorchester’s) testimony at the suppression hearing established probable cause to search defendant’s car based upon the smell of PCP, or, as the court described it, “olfactory detection of street-level PCP.” The opinion was as much directed to improprieties in the appellate brief as to  the “olfactory detection of PCP:”

“[A]s soon as I walked up to the vehicle,” Dorchester testified, “I could smell a really strong chemical odor that was familiar to myself as PCP.” Dorchester had received PCP training at the police academy; he regularly received updated training on PCP and other drugs; and he had encountered PCP and its distinctive smell “hundreds” of times over the course of his career as a police officer. Based on his training and experience, Dorchester testified, he immediately recognized the odor emanating from defendant’s vehicle as PCP. When pressed on whether he could have been smelling something else, Dorchester held firm: the smell of PCP, he explained, was “pretty distinct.” * * *

[I]t is astoundingly inaccurate for defendant’s brief to assert that “[t]his is a case of first impression.” Moreover, the representation in defendant’s brief that “none of the Appellate Divisions . . . has ever passed upon the question of whether the smell of PCP may, standing alone, constitute probable cause to search” is an unacceptable dereliction of counsel’s duty of candor to our Court, for the First Department has done precisely that in two separate cases … . And given that Sanchez [168 AD3d 584] involved a car search, the statement in defendant’s brief that “no appellate case law from this state . . . has approved the search of a vehicle based solely on the smell of PCP” is yet another misrepresentation of the caselaw. We take this opportunity to echo the First Department’s monition that “counsel has an obligation to bring adverse authority to [our] attention” … . * * *

… [D]efendant’s appellate brief levels serious allegations of perjury, official misconduct, and federal civil rights violations against officer Dorchester. The record, however, lacks any proof to substantiate appellate counsel’s accusations. It is one thing to suggest that Dorchester’s testimony was legally insufficient to justify the search … . But it is quite another thing to file a brief that directly, repeatedly, and unnecessarily accuses Dorchester of serious crimes without evidentiary support. Counsel’s “baseless assertions are shockingly irresponsible” … . People v Fudge, 2021 NY Slip Op 04801, Fourth Dept 8-26-21

 

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