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BECAUSE SOME OF THE ACTS CRIMINALIZED IN THE FLORIDA STATUTE CONSTITUTE NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONIES AND SOME DO NOT, THE FLORIDA ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MUST BE CONSULTED TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE ACTS INVOLVED; THE SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION WAS VACATED AND THE MATTER WAS SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department sent the matter back to County Court for a hearing to determine whether a Florida conviction supported sentencing defendant as a second violent felony offender:

The Florida robbery statute under which the defendant was convicted … criminalizes several different acts, some of which, if committed in New York, would constitute a violent felony pursuant to Penal Law § 160.15 or § 160.10, and some of which would not. Further, the Florida statute under which the defendant was convicted of possession of a weapon by a felon … does not set forth elements that are equivalent to a violent felony in New York (see Penal Law § 70.02[1]). Under such circumstances, resort to the Florida accusatory instrument, among other things, would be needed to ascertain the particular act or acts underlying the defendant’s convictions for robbery and possession of a weapon by a felon in Florida to determine whether the underlying acts were equivalent to a violent felony in New York … . People v Jamison, 2021 NY Slip Op 04668, Second Dept 8-11-21

 

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