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IN THIS RESENTENCING PROCEEDING, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT SINCE THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED IN 1998-99 AND SHOULD HAVE ORDERED AN UPDATED PRESENTENCE REPORT WHICH INCLUDED AN INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this resentencing proceeding, determined the sentencing judge could consider defendant’s conduct after the original sentence was imposed and should have ordered an updated presentence report, including an interview with the defendant. Defendant had been sentenced in 1998 and 1999 to 125 years of imprisonment. In 2019 defendant moved to set aside his sentence on the ground that is was vindictive and the People consented to setting the sentence aside:

The Supreme Court erred in determining that it had no discretion to consider the defendant’s conduct after the original sentence was imposed. In People v Kuey (83 NY2d 278, 282), the Court of Appeals noted that when a defendant comes before the court for resentencing, “the proper focus of the inquiry is on the defendant’s record prior to the commission of the crime.” However, the Court of Appeals did not purport to limit the sentencing court’s discretion. Indeed, in Kuey, the Court of Appeals further noted that the defendant was “afforded the opportunity to supply information about his subsequent conduct,” and that the court had discretion to order an updated presentence report regarding the defendant’s subsequent conduct, if it determined that such was necessary … .

Critically, unlike the resentencing proceeding in Kuey, the resentencing proceeding here was held because the original sentence was claimed to be vindictive, which is not merely a technical defect in the original sentence … , but implicates the original sentencing court’s failure to have observed sentencing principles before imposing sentence. Given the context under which the resentence was directed, the resentencing court must exercise discretion and give due consideration “to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the [resentencing] court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence” … . People v Garcia, 2021 NY Slip Op 04558, Second Dept 7-28-21

 

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