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SUPREME COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY UNDER CPLR 3001 TO ISSUE A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON THE PROPER RATE FOR POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST; ANOTHER COURT’S PRIOR DISCUSSION OF THE PROPER INTEREST RATE WAS MERELY ADVISORY (I.E., NOT ON THE MERITS) AND THEREFORE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR LAW OF THE CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, over an extensive dissent, determined (1) Supreme Court had the power to issue a declaratory judgment in this hybrid proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment on the rate of post-judgment interest; and (2) Supreme Court correctly found that dicta in a prior ruling about the proper post-judgment interest rate (i.e., that the rate should be 9% per year under the CPLR, not 2% per month under the Insurance Law) was merely “advisory” and therefore was not controlling under the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, or law of the case. Supreme Court’s finding that the Insurance Law interest rate applied was affirmed. Using that rate the original 2001 judgment of $8,842.49 had apparently grown to $229,981.66 as of 2015:

CPLR 3001 uniquely vests the Supreme Court with authority to render declaratory judgments to the exclusion of other courts of the state. … [T]o the extent [respondent] wished to obtain a declaratory judgment governing the rate of interest on its judgment, … with appellate remedies correctly foreclosed, the Supreme Court was the only court where it could seek redress on that issue. * * *

… [T]he Appellate Term’s expression in its decision and order dated August 18, 2017, regarding the applicable rate of interest was not determined on the merits, but was instead merely advisory. * * *

… [Appellant] was unable to establish that there was a determination on the merits in any prior proceeding about the proper rate of interest applicable to the judgment, as to preclude the Supreme Court from considering the issue de novo … . Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 NY Slip Op 04484, Second Dept 7-21-21

 

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