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IN A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, THE APPELLATE COURT DETERMINED COUNTY COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY APPLY THE DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE-SURVIVOR’S-ACT CRITERIA IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT FOR THE MURDER OF HER ABUSIVE HUSBAND; SENTENCES SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rivera, reversed County Court’s application of the Domestic Violence Survivor’s Act (social Services Law 459-a) and significantly reduced the sentences for murder and possession of a weapon. Defendant shot and killed her husband. The jury rejected defendant’s “battered women’s syndrome” defense. But the Second Department found that the criteria for sentence reduction under the DV Survivor’s Act had been met by the evidence:

… [W]e hold that the County Court did not properly apply the DV Survivor’s Act when sentencing the defendant. Upon considering the plain language of the DV Survivor’s Act, the legislative history of the statute, and the particular circumstances of this case, we modify the judgment, on the facts and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing (1) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of murder in the second degree from an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 19 years to life to a determinate term of imprisonment of 7½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, and (2) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree from a determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision to a determinate term of imprisonment of 3½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, which terms shall run concurrently with each other. * * *

Upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the crime, as well as the history, character, and condition of the defendant, we conclude that a sentence in accordance with the DV Survivor’s Act is warranted. The defendant is a 32-year-old mother of two young children, and has no known prior arrests or convictions. The defendant testified that she was repeatedly physically and sexually abused by Grover, as well as by other men in her past, and reportedly was sexually assaulted at the age of five. However, our examination under this factor does not end there. We also consider, among other things, the details of the crimes, including that the defendant shot Grover in the head as he was lying on the couch. Grover’s fatal injury was described as a hard contact wound in which the gun fired by the defendant was pressed against Grover’s skin, leaving a muzzle imprint. People v Addimando, 2021 NY Slip Op 04364, Second Dept 7-15-21

 

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