You are here: / / MURDER SECOND DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF MURDER FIRST (SECOND...

MURDER SECOND DISMISSED AS INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF MURDER FIRST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the murder second degree conviction should have been dismissed as an inclusory concurrent count of murder first degree:

… [T]he defendant’s conviction of murder in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law § 125.25(1) under count 2 of the indictment, as well as the sentence imposed thereon, must be vacated and that count dismissed because that charge constitutes an inclusory concurrent count of the conviction of murder in the first degree pursuant to Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(viii) (see CPL 300.40[3][b] …). People v Morel, 2021 NY Slip Op 04032, Second Dept 6-23-21

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF TURNED RIGHT INTO DEFENDANT DRIVER’S PATH AT AN INTERSECTION, DEFENDANT DRIVER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM FAULT AND DEFENDANT TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTING A STOP SIGN DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEARANCE RE: A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY BY THE VILLAGE PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.
THE STATEMENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHEN HE WAS UNDER MEDICATION AT THE HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; AT TRIAL THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REJECT THE STATEMENT IF THEY FOUND IT WAS INVOLUNTARILY MADE; AND THE DEFENSE BATSON CHALLENGE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FOUR AFRICAN-AMERICAN PROSPECTIVE JURORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DETERMINED DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAIVED DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS DISPOSITIVE AND NEVER LITIGATED; THE BANK’S FAILURE TO TIMELY MOVE FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (C) REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE BANK’S ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
BUS DRIVER WAS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, BUS CROSSED THE YELLOW LINE INTO PLAINTIFF’S ON-COMING LANE, NO EMERGENCY (SECOND DEPT).
THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST THE DIOCESE; PURSUANT TO THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS SEXUALLY ABUSED BY A PRIEST WHEN HE WAS 15 TO 16 (SECOND DEPT). ​
WHETHER THE VILLAGE POLICE WERE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION FOR WORK DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IS ARBITRABLE (SECOND DEPT). ​
CIVIL CONSPIRACY CANNOT BE BROUGHT AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT RADIOLOGIST WAS ASKED TO EVALUATE A MAMMOGRAM AS A ROUTINE-SCREENING... DEFENDANT DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-ACCIDENT...