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DEFENDANT DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S EIGHT-YEAR-OLD SON WAS MORE THAN HALFWAY ACROSS THE STREET WHEN STRUCK (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant driver’s motion for summary judgment in this pedestrian accident cause should not have been granted. Plaintiff’s eight-year-old son was struck by defendant and there was evidence the child was more than halfway across the road at the time he was struck:

… [T]he evidence submitted by the defendant in support of her motion, including a transcript of her own deposition testimony, failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether she was free from fault in the happening of the accident and, if not free from fault, whether the child’s purported negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . The evidence the defendant submitted indicated that the front passenger side of her vehicle came into contact with the child who, approaching from the defendant’s left, was more than halfway across the winding and curved roadway prior to impact (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1146[a], 1180[a], [e] …). Sage v Taylor, 2021 NY Slip Op 04048, Second Dept 6-23-21

 

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