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THE ERIE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE (ECSO) IS NOT A SEPARATE ENTITY APART FROM THE COUNTY; THE COUNTY MAY BE SUED FOR THE ACTIONS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE SHERIFF’S OFFICE PURSUANT TO RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; HERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT DIED IN HIS CAR AWAITING RESCUE DURING A SNOWSTORM (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the Erie County Sheriff’s Office (ECSO) is not a separate entity apart from the county, and the county may be liable for the acts of the sheriff’s office’s civilian employees pursuant to respondeat superior. The lawsuit alleged the defendants failed to timely rescue plaintiff’s decedent who died in his car during a snowstorm:

A sheriff’s office has no legal identity separate from its corresponding county, “and thus an ‘action against the Sheriff’s [Office] is, in effect, an action against the [corresponding] County itself’ ” … . …

Although a “county may not be held responsible for the negligent acts of the Sheriff and his [or her] deputies on the theory of respondeat superior” … , we conclude that a county may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the sheriff’s civilian employees given the general rule that a sheriff’s office does not exist separately from its corresponding county … . Moreover, and contrary to defendants’ further contention, the County is not entitled to immunity under Executive Law § 25 because that statute was not pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer (see CPLR 3018 [b] …). Abate v County of Erie, 2021 NY Slip Op 03940, Fourth Dept 6-17-21

 

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