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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S INDEMNIFICATION ACTION AGAINST A SUBCONTRACTOR BECAUSE THE SUBCONTRACTOR HAD BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE UNDERLYING PERSONAL INJURY ACTION BROUGHT BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S EMPLOYEES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that Conrad Geoscience Corp was not required to indemnify Kento, the general contractor for the removal of contaminated soil. Kento had hired Conrad to draw up environmental safety plans. The underlying lawsuit was brought by four Kento dump truck drivers who experienced dizziness during work and were treated at a hospital. Conrad won its motion for summary judgment in the underlying action because it did not exercise and supervisory control over the work done by the Kento employees. Collateral estoppel precluded Kento’s indemnification action against Conrad:

Several days prior to the Supreme Court’s denial of Conrad’s motion for summary judgment in this action, the court had granted that branch of Conrad’s motion, made in the underlying action commenced by the Ketco employees, which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in that action insofar as asserted against it. That determination was affirmed by this Court in a prior appeal, in which we concluded, “Conrad submitted evidence that, as the entity charged with creating environmental safety plans, it exercised no supervisory authority at the highway construction project work site and owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact” … . Based upon Ketco’s concession in its papers submitted in opposition to Conrad’s motion for summary judgment in this action, Conrad contends, in effect, that Ketco is collaterally estopped from seeking contractual indemnification against it. “Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity” … . Privity may be found where a nonparty to a prior litigation has “a relationship with a party to the prior litigation such that his [or her] own rights or obligations in the subsequent proceeding are conditioned in one way or another on, or derivative of, the rights of the party to the prior litigation” … . Here, we agree with Conrad’s contention that, under the circumstances, Ketco, which was clearly in privity with the Ketco employees, is bound by the prior determination of Conrad’s nonliability for the Ketco employees’ alleged injuries. New York State Thruway Auth. v Ketco, Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03462, Second Dept 6-2-21

 

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