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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION AND DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action, the defendants properly raised plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 in opposition to the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, and the plaintiff’s proof of compliance with the notice requirements was insufficient:

… [T]he plaintiff failed … to establish its standing to commence this action. The copy of the note submitted in support of the plaintiff’s motion contained two additional pages, the first entitled “Allonge to Note” and the second entitled “Note Allonge.” However, as the defendants correctly contend, the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to indicate that the purported allonges were so firmly affixed to the note so as to become a part thereof (see UCC 3-202[2] …). …

… [S]ince the proper service of a RPAPL 1304 notice is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action, the defendants could properly raise this defense for the first time in their opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and the burden of establishing prima facie compliance with the requirements of RPAPL 1304 was with the plaintiff … . …

… [I]n order to establish its compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304, the plaintiff submitted two affidavits from its “authorized signer,” Tracy A. Duck. However, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, neither affidavit was sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s strict compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304. Among other things, Duck did not aver that she was familiar with the mailing practices and procedures of the entity that purportedly sent the notices … . Moreover, the business records attached to Duck’s second affidavit were insufficient to establish compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . LNV Corp. v Almberg, 2021 NY Slip Op 02791, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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