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PEDESTRIAN PLAINTIFF’S EMERGING FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS AND ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendants demonstrated plaintiff's emerging from between parked cars and attempting to cross the street where there was no crosswalk constituted the sole proximate cause of the pedestrian-vehicle accident

… [T]he defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff, given his actions in crossing the street as he did at the time of the accident, violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1152(a) and was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The plaintiff opposed the defendants' motion on the ground, among others, that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant driver operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion, and the defendants appeal.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the conduct of the plaintiff in crossing the street at a location other than at an intersection, while emerging from between vehicles in the left lane of eastbound traffic, was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that the defendant driver was free from fault despite the plaintiff's allegation that he failed to avoid a collision with the plaintiff … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant driver operated the vehicle in a negligent manner or failed to see that which, through proper use of his senses, he should have seen … . Pixtun-Suret v Gevinski, 2018 NY Slip Op 06581, Second Dept 10-3-18

NEGLIGENCE (PEDESTRIAN PLAINTIFF'S EMERGING FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS AND ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PEDESTRIAN PLAINTIFF'S EMERGING FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS AND ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/PEDESTRIANS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, PEDESTRIAN PLAINTIFF'S EMERGING FROM BETWEEN PARKED CARS AND ATTEMPTING TO CROSS THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PEDESTRIAN-VEHICLE ACCIDENT, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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