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SUPREME COURT DID NOT CONDUCT A HEARING OR FOLLOW THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT FORMULA FOR CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATIONS; IN ADDITION THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST RESTITUTION OR RECOUPMENT OF CHIILD SUPPORT ALREADY PAID; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court did not conduct a hearing, did not follow the child support formula of the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) and did not consider the public policy against recoupment or restitution of child support already paid. The matter was remitted for a hearing and a new determination:

… [T]he Supreme Court did not calculate the basic child support obligation for the children, which is done by (1) determining the combined parental income and (2) multiplying the amount of combined parental income up to the statutory cap by the appropriate child support percentage (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][c]). The court did not determine the combined parental income or identify the applicable statutory cap. It further failed to determine each parent’s pro rata share of the basic child support obligation based on his or her income in proportion to the combined parental income … . Rather, the court incorrectly determined the amount of child support owed to the custodial parent based solely on the noncustodial parent’s income multiplied by the appropriate child support percentage, which the court determined to be 25% of the plaintiff’s income. However, the appropriate basic child support figure for the parties’ two children was 25% of the combined parental income, as prorated between the parties in accordance with the statute (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][b][3][ii]). … [T]here is no indication that the court considered “[t]he financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent” or whether “the gross income of one parent is substantially less than the other parent’s gross income” … . Park v Park, 2021 NY Slip Op 02536, Second Dept 4-28-21

 

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