THE PARTIES MARRIED IN 1974, STARTED DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS IN 1991, DISCONTINUED THE DIVORCE AND BEGAN LIVING TOGETHER AGAIN IN 1998, CONTINUED LIVING TOGETHER UNTIL THE INSTANT DIVORCE IN 2015; SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP ENDED IN 1991; MATTER REMITTED FOR RECALCULATION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY AND COUNSEL FEES (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department, remitting the matter for recalculation of equitable distribution of marital assets and counsel fees, determined Supreme Court erred in finding that the parties ceased to be an economic partnership when they separated and divorce proceedings were commenced in 1991. The parties were married in 1974. The divorce was discontinued in 1998 when defendant moved back into the marital residence. The couple lived together until the instant separation and divorce proceedings in 2015:
… [T]he parties resided together in the marital residence from 1998 until the commencement of the subject action in 2015, and for most of that time, shared the marital residence with the children. During that time, the parties visited relatives and attended social functions together, went on vacations together, and periodically engaged in sexual relations. Although the parties maintained separate bank accounts and credit cards, the parties filed joint tax returns and shared many of the family’s expenses, including the children’s college tuition and home renovations. Moreover, the parties named each other as executors and beneficiaries in their wills. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that the parties functioned as an “economic partnership” after the discontinuance of the prior divorce action, and the Supreme Court improperly found that the parties “ceased functioning as an economic partnership” and “lived separate financial lives” starting in 1991 … . …
… [T]here was no written agreement to keep the parties’ finances separate (cf. Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][4]). “Marital partners may agree that property they acquire during the marriage will be divided in a particular manner, but that agreement must be in writing” … , or “be part of an oral stipulation placed upon the record in open court and acknowledged in writing to be free from fraud, undue influence and duress” … . Here, the alleged oral agreement between the parties does not constitute such an agreement. Thus, the distribution of marital property “must be based upon the equitable consideration and application of . . . enumerated factors” … , and the court is required to “set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision” … . Potvin v Potvin, 2021 NY Slip Op 02429, Second Dept 4-21-21
