You are here: / / PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A FALLING REBAR, WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE...

PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY A FALLING REBAR, WAS NOT REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE REBAR FALLING; IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE REBAR SHOULD HAVE BEEN SECURED SUCH THAT IT WOULD NOT FALL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action in this falling object case should have been granted. Plaintiff was struck by a falling rebar:

Plaintiff, a journeyman ironworker at the Hudson Yards project, was injured when a piece of rebar fell from 30 feet above, striking him. In moving for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim, plaintiff was not required to show the exact circumstances of how the rebar came to strike him, as his testimony, that a coworker was working with rebar 30 feet above him on the same column immediately before the accident, was sufficient evidence that the rebar, whether it was dropped or fell in some other manner, was material requiring securing … . In that plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on his testimony alone, the admissibility of his coworker’s unsigned deposition transcript is a moot point. Defendants failed to adduce any evidence raising a question of fact to warrant denial of plaintiff’s motion. Pados v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 01855, First Dept 3-25-21

 

You might also like
A JUDGE CANNOT ENTER A JUDGMENT WHICH DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE ORDER; HERE THE JUDGMENT ELIMINATED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN DAMAGES AND EXTINGUISHED A DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY (FIRST DEPT).
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED A MOTION TO DISMISS, LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY TO COURTS OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION.
​EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGES, AS OPPOSED TO PECUNIARY DAMAGES, WILL NOT SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (FIRST DEPT). ​
EVEN THOUGH THE US SUPREME COURT CASE REQUIRING WARRANTS FOR CELL SITE LOCATION DATA WAS NOT DECIDED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL, PRESERVATION OF THAT ISSUE FOR APPEAL IS STILL NECESSARY; A DEFENDANT MAY BE INDICTED FOR BOTH DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE AND INTENTIONAL MURDER; CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR THE SHOOTINGS AND POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WERE APPROPRIATE (FIRST DEPT). ​
REFERENCES TO DEFENDANT’S PRIOR COMMISSION OF A VIOLENT CRIME AND IMPRISONMENT WERE INTERTWINED WITH THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY DUE TO MENTAL ILLNESS, THE PROBATIVE VALUE OUTWEIGHED THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
THE TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN THE CONTRACT RENDERED A CRUCIAL SENTENCE AMBIGUOUS; THE ERROR COULD NOT BE CORRECTED WITHOUT POSSIBLY ALTERING THE PARTIES’ INTENT; THEREFORE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT (FIRST DEPT).
HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS STEMMING FROM THE DENIAL OF BAIL IN AN ATTEMPTED MURDER CASE PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
MOLD-INJURY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED AT THE PLEADING STAGE, PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY PLED THE DEVELOPMENT OF “NEW” SYMPTOMS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF FILING SUIT.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE NYPD OFFICER WHO EMPLOYED A PROHIBITED CHOKEHOLD ON ERIC GARNER, WHICH CONTRIBUTED... ALTHOUGH THE COMPLAINT WAS DEFECTIVE, AFFIDAVITS AND OTHER EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATE...