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THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED RESPONDENT, WHO HAD ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT RESPONSIBLE BY REASON OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT TO RAPE, ASSAULT AND OTHER CHARGES, SUFFERED FROM A DANGEROUS MENTAL DISORDER REQUIRING CONTINUED PLACEMENT IN A SECURE FACILITY, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent constituted a danger to himself and others and should remain in a secure facility. Respondent had entered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect to rape, assault, criminal possession of a weapon and endangering the welfare of a child. Supreme Court had found that respondent was no longer suffering from a dangerous mental disorder and placed him in a nonsecure facility:

To establish that a person suffers from a dangerous mental disorder requiring commitment in a secure facility, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the person suffers from a “mental illness,” as that term is statutorily defined (see Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03 [20]), and “that because of such condition he [or she] constitutes a physical danger to himself [or herself] or others” (CPL 330.20 [1] [c]). * * *

Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s evidence and instead concluded that respondent no longer suffered from a dangerous mental disorder, implicitly crediting the opinion of respondent’s expert. However, the court’s factual findings were self-contradictory. Supreme Court credited petitioner’s expert’s diagnoses of respondent, finding, among other things, that respondent has bipolar disorder and a traumatic brain injury. These diagnoses, which cause impaired judgment and impulse control, contributed to the opinion of petitioner’s expert that respondent constituted a present danger to himself and to his female peers. Without explanation, respondent’s expert omitted the diagnoses of bipolar disorder and traumatic brain injury. In concluding that respondent no longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, Supreme Court relied upon an opinion that did not account for diagnoses that the court found respondent to have. Thus, the court never considered the impact that the diagnoses have on respondent’s behavior and present dangerousness.  Matter of James Q., 2021 NY Slip Op 01545, Third Dept 3-18-21

 

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