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PLAINTIFF HAD TO USE AN A-FRAME LADDER ON TOP OF A SCAFFOLD TO REACH THE WORK AREA; THE SCAFFOLD MOVED AND PLAINTIFF FELL TO THE GROUND; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action and one of the Labor Law 241(6) causes of action properly survived summary judgment. Plaintiff was using a scaffold that wasn’t high enough. He therefore used an A-frame ladder in the closed position on top of the scaffold. The scaffold move, the ladder fell over and plaintiff fell to the ground:

… [D]efendants failed to raise a triable issue. Defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident is unavailing, since he was not provided a proper safety device to prevent his fall, and that failure is a cause of his injuries … .

Additionally, contrary to defendants’ argument, there is no requirement for Labor Law § 240(1) purposes that plaintiff know exactly the cause of his accident, or what caused the scaffold or ladder to move, where there is no dispute that the safety devices failed … . Moreover, it is not relevant that the ladder and scaffold were free from defects … .

[Defendant] failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on alleged violations of Industrial Code §§ 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) and (iv), as there is sufficient testimony in the record to support such violations, including that the ladder was unsecured and lacked rubber footing, and no one was holding it in place at the time of plaintiff’s fall. [Defendant] failed to establish as a matter of law that the alleged violations were not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident. Martinez v ST-DIL LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01513, First Dept 3-16-21

 

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