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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATING TO THE COURT THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS FRIVOLOUS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a report on defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, determined defense counsel, by stating to the court that defendant’s motion was frivolous, had taken a position adverse to the client:

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree, but at sentencing, the defendant stated that he wished to withdraw his plea, which he claimed had been coerced by his counsel. The County Court relieved defense counsel, and assigned new counsel to represent the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant’s new counsel advised the court that after evaluating the evidence, the defendant’s allocution, and after speaking to the defendant and his prior attorney, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty would be frivolous. The court granted the defendant a number of adjournments to permit him to retain private counsel to pursue his motion to withdraw his plea, but when the defendant failed to do so, the court ultimately sentenced him, while he was still represented by the second assigned counsel. …

We agree with the defendant that his right to counsel was adversely affected, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel, when his counsel took a position adverse to his … . The County Court should have appointed new counsel to represent the defendant with respect to the motion to withdraw his plea of guilty … . People v Fellows, 2021 NY Slip Op 01269, Second Dept 3-3-21

 

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