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CARRIER PROPERLY ORDERED TO PAY FOR CLAIMAINT’S PAIN TREATMENT WITH MEDICAL MARIJUANA (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Egan, determined the Workers’ Compensation Board properly issued a variance allowing coverage for medical marijuana for treatment of claimant’s pain. The opinion is too detailed to fairly summarize here. The carrier’s federal conflict preemption and statutory (Public Health Law) exemption arguments were rejected:

“The federal preemption doctrine has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and federal preemption of state laws generally can occur in three ways: where Congress has expressly preempted state law, where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law, or where federal law conflicts with state law” … . At issue here is conflict preemption, “which occurs when compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility, or where the state law at issue . . . stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” … .

* * * [R]equiring the carrier to reimburse claimant … does not serve to subvert, in any way, the principal purposes of the Controlled Substances Act in combating drug abuse and controlling “the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” … , particularly where, as here, claimant was validly prescribed and authorized to use medical marihuana by his pain management specialist to both treat his chronic pain and reduce his reliance on opiates. Matter of Quigley v Village of E. Aurora, 2021 NY Slip Op 01174, Third Dept 2-25-21

 

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