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HABEAS CORPUS PETITION ORDERING THE RELEASE OF A PRISONER BECAUSE OF THE RISK POSED BY COVID-19 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE PETITION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PRISON OFFICIALS WERE DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT TO THE RISK (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Devine, reversing Supreme Court, determined the habeas corpus petition seeking the release from prison of a 68-year-old prisoner because of the danger of contracting COVID-19 should not have been granted. At the time the appeal was heard, the inmate, Muntaqim, was hospitalized with COVID-19. The appeal was heard as an exception to the mootness doctrine because the situation is likely to recur. Although the petition established Muntaqim was incarcerated under conditions which could cause him serious harm, the petition did not demonstrate the prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to the risk. The prison respondents outlined the steps taken and the prison to reduce the spread of the disease:

Petitioner arguably established that Muntaqim was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” … . Annexed to the petition is a letter from a physician who discussed Muntaqim’s medical condition and opined that he was at extreme risk of “a serious and possible fatal outcome if infected with the novel coronavirus” responsible for causing COVID-19, as well as a letter from a group of physicians who explained that the novel coronavirus is quite infectious and that serious outbreaks in prisons were inevitable given the close contact between individuals inherent to the prison setting. … What petitioner failed to demonstrate, however, was deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. Petitioner provided nothing from anyone with firsthand knowledge — including Muntaqim, who neither verified the petition nor submitted an affidavit in support of it — as to what was being done to combat the spread of the novel coronavirus at SCF [Sullivan Correctional Facility] or to protect inmates at high risk from COVID-19. In contrast, respondents came forward with the affidavit of respondent Superintendent of SCF, who detailed the steps that had been taken up to that point to prevent the introduction of the novel coronavirus into the facility and reduce the risks of potential transmission. … Supreme Court determined that DOCCS had “done nothing wrong” in its response to the burgeoning threat. Petitioner has not demonstrated the subjective element of deliberate indifference required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. People ex rel. Carroll v Keyser, 2020 NY Slip Op 03169, Third Dept 6-4-20

 

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