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ALTHOUGH THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW GAVE THE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER THE AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE NURSING HOME’S ADMISSION AGREEMENT ON BEHALF OF HER FATHER, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW DID NOT GIVE HER THE AUTHORITY TO SIGN A BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ON HER FATHER’S BEHALF; THEREFORE THE DECEDENT’S WIFE WAS NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN HER SUIT AGAINST THE NURSING HOME (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff wife’s adult daughter had the authority, pursuant to the Public Health Law, to execute the nursing home’s admission agreement on behalf of plaintiff’s husband (her father), who was deemed incapable of making health-care related decisions. In addition to the admission agreement, plaintiff’s daughter signed a binding arbitration agreement on her father’s behalf. After plaintiff’s husband died, plaintiff sued the nursing home which asserted that that the matter was subject to the arbitration agreement. The First Department held that, pursuant to the Public Health Law, plaintiff’s daughter had the authority to sign the admission agreement, because it related to her father’s health care, but she did not have the authority to sign the arbitration agreement:

The authority of the decedent’s daughter to act as a “surrogate” decision-maker pursuant to PHL 2994-d at the time decedent was admitted to JHL was limited to making decisions regarding “[a]ny treatment, service, or procedure to diagnose or treat an individual’s physical or mental condition” (PHL 2994-a[12]). Although she had authority, pursuant to PHL 2994-d, to execute the Agreement for purposes of admitting her father into the facility for health care treatment, she did not have the authority to execute the Binding Arbitration Agreement on his behalf. Such agreement was entirely optional and had no bearing on the father’s health care. Accordingly, it is entirely outside of the purview of surrogate decision-maker’s authority set forth in PHL 2994-d. Gayle v Regeis Care Ctr., LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op 01197, First Dept 2-25-21

 

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