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DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED BY DRUGS, NOT ALCOHOL; DIRECTION TO INSTALL AN IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE APPLIES ONLY TO OFFENSES INVOLVING ALCOHOL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) County Court, determined the offense to which defendant pled guilty did not involve alcohol and, therefore, the direction to install an ignition interlock device must be vacated:

… [T]he County Court improperly imposed an ignition interlock device requirement upon the defendant. The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2-a)(b) for “[d]riving while ability impaired by drugs” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[4]). A court may impose an ignition interlock device as a condition of probation and conditional discharge only for offenses involving alcohol (see Penal Law § 65.10[2][k-1]). The defendant’s conviction here falls outside the scope of the statute authorizing the imposition of such a condition … . People v Miller, 2021 NY Slip Op 00868, Second Dept 2-10-21

 

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