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THE NYC HOUSING STABILITY AND TENANT PROTECTION ACT OF 2019 PART I, WHICH IMPOSES RESTRICTIONS ON A LANDLORD’S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO RENEW A RENT-STABILIZED LEASE, DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS HOLDOVER PROCEEDING WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN THE LAW WAS ENACTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing the Appellate Term, determined the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019  (HSTPA) Part I did not apply to did not apply to the instant holdover proceeding which was pending when the HSTPA was enacted:

As amended by HSTPA Part I … , Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-511(c)(9)(b), which governs an owner’s right to refuse to renew a rent-stabilized lease on the ground that the owner seeks the unit for his or her own personal use and occupancy as a primary residence, limits the owner to the recovery of only one dwelling unit in a building, requires proof of “immediate and compelling necessity” for the owner’s use, and requires that the owner provide an equivalent housing accommodation for any tenant over the age of 62 and in occupancy for 15 years or more. …

… [F]our months after Appellate Term issued its decision in this proceeding, the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (35 NY3d 332 [2020]), holding that HSTPA Part F, relating to rent overcharges, could not be applied to pending cases because “application of these amendments to past conduct would not comport with our retroactivity jurisprudence or the requirements of due process” … .

We conclude that the same reasoning applies with equal measure to HSTPA Part I. Matter of Harris v Israel, 2021 NY Slip Op 00796, First Dept 2-9-21

 

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