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THE ESTATE OF A PARTY TO A SEPARATION AGREEMENT MAY SEEK A DOWNWARD MODIFICATION OF THE AGREED MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS; THE DISSENT ARGUED ONLY THE PARTY, NOT THE ESTATE OF THE PARTY, CAN SEEK A DOWNWARD MODIFICATION AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED IN PROBATE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined that the estate of a party to a separation agreement that was merged but not incorporated into a judgment of divorce could seek a downward modification of the maintenance payments. The dissent argued only the party to the agreement, not the estate of the party, could seek a downward modification based on extreme hardship:

FROM THE DISSENT:

… [T]his Court recently held that plaintiff and defendant’s decedent entered into a Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (settlement agreement), which was incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce, whereby decedent agreed to pay lifetime maintenance to plaintiff that continued even in the event of decedent’s death … . * * *

Pursuant to the Domestic Relations Law, “[w]here . . . [a separation agreement] remains in force, no modification of an order or judgment incorporating the terms of said agreement shall be made as to maintenance without a showing of extreme hardship on either party” (§ 236 [B] [9] [b] [1] …). A modification of maintenance based on extreme hardship is thus, personal to the parties who contracted as to the amount of maintenance in the separation agreement and, as noted, a modification of that amount has only been awarded in situations involving personal hardships. In my view, an “estate” can never establish a personal hardship and thus, is never entitled to a downward modification of maintenance. While defendant in this case submitted evidence that the continued payment of the maintenance obligation would pose a hardship on the estate, such a hardship is not upon any party to the settlement agreement. Indeed, it is only a hardship upon the beneficiaries of decedent’s estate who wish to maximize their inheritance. In my view, any difficulty in the estate’s ability to pay the amount of lifetime maintenance agreed to by decedent is an issue that should be raised by the estate in the probate court when determining the reserve funds to be set aside to satisfy the maintenance obligation. Gardner v Zammit, 2021 NY Slip Op 00707, Fourth Dept 2-5-21

 

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