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PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A POLICE OFFICER SUFFERING FROM BIPOLAR DISORDER, COMMITTED SUICIDE; THE ESTATE BROUGHT A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST THE CITY; ALTHOUGH THE FACTS SUPPORTED AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIM, THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION; THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta. determined plaintiff’s decedent (Benitez), a police officer who committed suicide, was disabled by bipolar disorder and was entitled to accommodation under the state and city Human Rights Law. However, because the estate brought a wrongful death action, and did not allege Human Rights Law discrimination causes of action, the complaint was properly dismissed:

… [P]laintiff conceded that this case “ha[d] been primarily brought on a claim of negligence,” that it had not interposed separate statutory causes of action, and that “this [wa]s a negligence c[ase], not a c[ase] based on discriminatory practices.” …

Inasmuch as plaintiff did not raise any Human Rights Law violations for failure to accommodate, we are constrained to affirm … . Supreme Court correctly concluded that defendants did not owe Benitez a duty to prevent him from committing suicide. A defendant owes such a duty where it is either “a facility such as a hospital or jail which is in actual physical custody of an individual” or “an institution or mental health professional with sufficient expertise to detect suicidal tendencies and with the control necessary to care for the person’s well-being” … . Here, defendants had neither “actual physical custody” of the decedent nor “the control necessary to care for [his] well-being” before his suicide … . Furthermore, a defendant only breaches its duty to prevent a decedent’s suicide when it “fails to take reasonable steps to prevent a reasonably foreseeable suicide … ,” and there is no evidence in this case that the decedent’s suicide was “reasonably foreseeable” … .

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the NYPD failed to accommodate Benitez under, among other statutes, the City Human Rights Law (City HRL). However, plaintiff improperly raises elements of disability discrimination in the context of a wrongful death action. Benitez v City of New York, 2021 NY Slip Op 00617, First Dept 2-4-21

 

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AFTER TWICE ADMITTING OWNERSHIP OF THE AREA OF PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL,... THE BOARD DEPARTED FROM ITS PRECEDENT WITHOUT EXPLANATION, REVERSED AND REMITTED...