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COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED A NEW THEORY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the court should not have considered a new theory of medical malpractice raised for the first time in response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment:

… [T]he complaint and bill of particulars were only sufficient to put defendant on notice of an allegation that, in January 2013, he failed to properly compare the 2013 EC [echocardiagram] with the 2011 EC contained in decedent’s medical record, and determine that a dilation in decedent’s aorta had increased. Plaintiffs’ papers were insufficient to put defendant on notice of plaintiffs’ new theory of liability – raised for the first time in her expert’s opinion – that he deviated from the standard of care in August 2011, when interpreting the 2011 EC … . Here, where negligence is specifically alleged to have occurred only between December 2012 and January 2013, we conclude that the vague, ambiguous, nonspecific and open-ended assertion “prior or subsequent thereto” contained in plaintiffs’ bill of particulars failed to put defendant on notice of a claim that he acted negligently in August 2011. Carroll v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 08524, First Dept 11-26-19

 

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