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You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED ON HEARSAY;...
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED ON HEARSAY; THE SECOND MORTGAGE WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO MEET THE REQUIRMENTS OF RPAPL 1351 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report was based upon hearsay and should not have been confirmed. In addition, the proof a second mortgage met the requirements of RPAPL 1351 and 1354 was insufficient:

“The report of a referee should be confirmed whenever the findings are substantially supported by the record, and the referee has clearly defined the issues and resolved matters of credibility” … . Here, the affidavit executed by an employee of the plaintiff’s loan servicer, which was submitted by the plaintiff for the purpose of establishing the amount due and owing under the mortgage loan, constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked probative value because the affiant failed to produce any of the business records upon which she purportedly relied in making her calculations … . Consequently, the referee’s findings with respect to the total amount due upon the mortgage were not substantially supported by the record … .

… In an action to foreclose a mortgage commenced by a first mortgagee, a second mortgagee may move for a provision in the judgment of foreclosure and sale that any surplus moneys from the foreclosure sale be applied to satisfy the debt owed by the defendant to the second mortgagee (see RPAPL 1351[3]). Such a motion may be granted if “it appears to the satisfaction of the court” that there exists no more than one other mortgage on the subject premises which is “then due” and subordinate only to the plaintiff’s mortgage but is entitled to priority over all other liens and encumbrances other than those described RPAPL 1354(2), and if the motion of the second mortgagee is “made without valid objection of any other party” (RPAPL 1351[3]).

Here, [the] motion papers insufficient, prima facie, to meet the requisite standard (see RPAPL 1351[3]) … . U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 2020 NY Slip Op 08099, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

December 30, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-12-30 11:03:412021-01-02 11:22:21THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED ON HEARSAY; THE SECOND MORTGAGE WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO MEET THE REQUIRMENTS OF RPAPL 1351 (SECOND DEPT).
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