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THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE COULD SUE FOR DECEDENT’S CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING BUT, BECAUSE THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION HAD NOT BEEN LISTED AS AN ASSET IN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING, THE ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SUE ON BEHALF OF THE DISTRIUBUTEE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court in this wrongful death action, determined that the plaintiff, who was the administrator of the estate and the sole distributee, could bring an action for conscious pain and suffering because that claim was personal to the decedent and part of the estate. But, because the wrongful death action, which vested in the plaintiff/distributee upon death, was not listed as an asset in the plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings, to which the decedent was not a party, the plaintiff did not have the capacity to bring that claim:

… [T]he plaintiff, as the administrator of the decedent’s estate, had the capacity to prosecute the cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering. A cause of action brought on behalf of a deceased to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering is “personal to the deceased and belongs to the estate, not the distributees” … . The decedent was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, the bankruptcy did not affect the plaintiff’s capacity to prosecute the cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering on behalf of the decedent’s estate … .

The Supreme Court, however, should have granted those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which were to dismiss the cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death insofar as asserted against each of them. “A cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death is a property right belonging solely to the distributees of the decedent and vests in them at the decedent’s death” (… EPTL 5-4.4 [a]). It is undisputed that the cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death vested in the plaintiff as the sole distributee of the estate prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, as the plaintiff failed to schedule the wrongful death claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, it is subject to dismissal in this action on the ground that the plaintiff lacks the capacity to pursue the claim … . Vinogradov v Bay Plaza Apts Co., LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 08104, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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THE REFEREE’S REPORT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS BASED ON HEARSAY;... AN INSURER WHO HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND THE INSUREDS BECAUSE OF LATE NOTIFICATION,...