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MOTHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should have been advised of her right to counsel in this custody proceeding:

“Family Court Act § 262 provides certain parties to particular Family Court proceedings with a statutory right to counsel. If the party in question falls within one of the enumerated subdivisions thereto, he or she must be advised by the court, before proceeding, that he or she has the right to representation, the right to seek an adjournment to confer with counsel and the right to assigned counsel if he or she cannot afford to retain counsel” … . The deprivation of a party’s fundamental right to counsel in a custody or visitation proceeding requires reversal, without regard to the merits of the unrepresented party’s position … .

Here, the mother clearly fell within one of the enumerated subdivisions of Family Court Act § 262 because she was the respondent in a custody modification proceeding. Therefore, the Family Court should have advised the mother of her right to counsel. Matter of Follini v Currie, 2020 NY Slip Op 08062, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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