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A GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICE ACTION AGAINST THE CITY SOUNDS IN TORT TRIGGERING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that a deceptive business practice cause of action pursuant to General Business Law 349 sounds in tort. The GBL 349 cause of action against the city did not state a cause of action because no notice of claim was filed:

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 and General Municipal Law § 50-e together require a plaintiff, in order to bring an action sounding in tort against the City of New York, to serve a notice of claim within ninety days after the date the claim arises … . Failure to comply with a statutory notice of claim requirement is a ground for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action … .

General Business Law § 349(a) prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state” … . We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which sought to recover damages for violations of General Business Law § 349, was a claim sounding in tort, and therefore was subject to the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e, as a cause of action sounding in fraud … . Accordingly, we agree with the court’s determination granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action due to the plaintiffs’ failure to serve a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arose … . Singh v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 08123, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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