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THE SOLE REMEDY PROVISION IN THE REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES AGREEMENT IN THIS RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CASE WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE; THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE PUBLIC POLICY RULE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE SOLE REMEDY PROVISION IMPOSES REASONABLE LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY OR REMEDIES (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, over a partial dissent, held that the sole remedy provision in the Representations and Warranties Agreement (RWA) in this residential mortgage-backed securities (RBMS) case was valid and enforceable. Plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to avoid the sole remedy provision by arguing the defendants breached the contract with gross negligence:

… [W]e … conclude that the parties’ contract, as written, means what it says. In this RMBS put-back action, plaintiff seeks to avoid a provision in the contract … that sets out a sole remedy for a breach by alleging that defendants breached the contract with gross negligence. This sole remedy provision purports to limit, but not eliminate, the remedies available to the plaintiff in the event of a breach. We conclude that, in a breach of contract action, the public policy rule prohibiting parties from insulating themselves from damages caused by grossly negligent conduct applies only to exculpatory clauses or provisions that limit liability to a nominal sum. The rule does not apply to contractual limitations on remedies that do not immunize the breaching party from liability for its conduct. The sole remedy provision is not an exculpatory or nominal damages clause. Plaintiff cannot render it unenforceable through allegations of gross negligence. * * *

We have previously considered the application of the gross negligence public policy rule only in cases where the contract provision at issue was an exculpatory clause, purporting to wholly immunize a party from liability, or a nominal damages clause limiting damages to, at most, $250 … . We have not yet determined whether grossly negligent conduct may render unenforceable contractual provisions that do not wholly insulate a party from liability for its breach, but instead impose reasonable limitations on either liability or the remedies available to the non-breaching party. We conclude that, in a breach of contract case, grossly negligent conduct will render unenforceable only exculpatory or nominal damages clauses, and the public policy rule does not extend to limitations on the remedies available to the non-breaching party. Matter of Part 60 Put-Back Litig., 2020 NY Slip Op 07687, CtApp 12-22-20

 

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