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THE NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ACTION AGAINST PHYSICAL-THERAPY DEFENDANTS SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REQUIRING EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE; THE DOCTRINE OF OSTENSIBLE OR APPARENT AGENCY RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE PHYSICAL-THERAPY FACILITY WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE THERAPIST, WHO WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined: (1) the negligent supervision cause of action against defendants’ physical therapy services sounded in medical malpractice and therefore required expert opinion evidence; and (2) the defendant physical therapist (Gonikman) was an independent contractor but the doctrine of ostensible or apparent agency raised a question of fact about the facility’s (KCM’s) vicarious liability for Gonikman’s alleged negligence. Plaintiff’s infant daughter, who was receiving physical therapy, fell off a scooter and was injured:

Though a medical facility can be held liable for the negligence or malpractice of its employees, it is not generally held liable when the treatment is provided by an independent contractor, even if the facility affiliates itself with that independent contractor … . However, the facility may be held vicariously liable under a theory of apparent or ostensible agency by estoppel … . “In order to create such apparent agency, there must be words or conduct of the principal, communicated to a third party, which give rise to the appearance and belief that the agent possesses the authority to act on behalf of the principal” … . “The third party must reasonably rely on the appearance of authority, based on some misleading words or conduct by the principal, not the agent” … . “Moreover, the third party must accept the services of the agent in reliance upon the perceived relationship between the agent and the principal, and not in reliance on the agent’s skill” … . …

… [S]ince the conduct at issue in the complaint stems from Gonikman’s generalized treatment plan and alleged negligent supervision of the infant daughter during her physical therapy session, the allegation sounds in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence, because Gonikman’s duty towards the infant daughter derived from the physical therapist-patient relationship … . In support of his cross motion, Gonikman merely submitted a conclusory statement that his therapy plan of activities was consistent with the accepted standard of care, and he failed to submit an expert’s affidavit to establish that he did not deviate from the accepted standard of care for physical therapy … . Weiszberger v KCM Therapy, 2020 NY Slip Op 07425, Second Dept 12-9-20

 

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