New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Evidence2 / THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF...
Evidence, Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s summary judgment motion should not have been granted because the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304:

“In a residential foreclosure action, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment must tender sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of material issues as to its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304” … . RPAPL 1304(1) provides that “at least ninety days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower . . . , including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower.” “The statute further provides the required content for the notice and provides that the notice must be sent by registered or certified mail and also by first-class mail to the last known address of the borrower” … . Strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action … . Proof of the requisite mailings “can be established with proof of the actual mailings, such as affidavits of mailing or domestic return receipts with attendant signatures, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure” … . …

… [W]ith respect to the mailing by first-class mail, “[t]he presence of 20-digit numbers on the copies of the 90-day notices submitted by the plaintiff, standing alone, did not suffice to establish, prima facie, proper mailing under RPAPL 1304” … . As to Babik’s [the loan servicer’s employee’s] affidavit, not only did Babik “not attest to personal knowledge of the mailing [or] set forth any details regarding … [the loan servicer’s] mailing practices or procedures” … , she did not aver that a 90-day notice was sent in accordance with the statute … . Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Hershkowitz, 2020 NY Slip Op 07427, Second Dept 12-9-20

 

December 9, 2020
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-12-09 09:59:482020-12-13 10:15:39THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY ESSENTIALLY FAILED TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON THE SORA RISK ASSESSMENT; NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Prosecutor Acted as an Unsworn Witness and Improperly Suggested Defendant Committed Offenses With Which He Was Not Charged—Conviction Reversed in the Interest of Justice
DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE (1) THE STAIRS DOWN WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL WERE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE A HANDRAIL (2) THE STAIRS WERE ADEQUATELY ILLUMINATED (3) OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD STATUS, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
CPLR 205 (a), WHICH ALLOWS SIX MONTHS FOR RECOMMENCING AN ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL, APPLIES TO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN WHEN THE CURRENT HOLDER OF THE NOTE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE PARTY WHICH STARTED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION.
MANUFACTURER OF A TUBE SLIDE AND THE PROPERTY OWNER WHERE THE TUBE SLIDE WAS LOCATED ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; INFANT PLAINTIFF FELL WHEN CLIMBING ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE TUBE SLIDE.
School District Not On Notice Such that the Assault by Another Student Was Foreseeable
THE FACT THAT A MORTGAGE IS MERELY INSURED BY HUD OR THE FHA DOES NOT MAKE THE BANK WHICH HOLDS THE MORTGAGE AN ASSIGNEE OF A FEDERAL AGENCY SUCH THAT NEW YORK’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT APPLY; A BANK IS NOT AN ASSIGNEE OF HUD OR THE FHA IF IT WAS NOT ASSIGNED THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE THE INSURED MORTGAGE (SECOND DEPT).
INFECTING A VICTIM WITH HIV CONSTITUTES “PHYSICAL INJURY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF RISK FACTOR 1 RE: THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; HOWEVER THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT IN FACT INFECTED THE VICTIM WITH HIV WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; SUCCESSIVE SUMMARY... THE CRITERIA FOR THE HARSH REMEDY OF ATTACHMENT WERE NOT MET (SECOND DEPT).
Scroll to top