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THE RECEIPT OF THE LETTER BY CERTIFIED MAIL, NOT THE PRIOR RECEIPT OF AN EMAIL WITH THE LETTER ATTACHED, TRIGGERED THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR BRINGING AN ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING; THE OMISSION OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BE SERVED WITH THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE COULD BE REMEDIED BY AN EXTENSION OF THE TIME TO EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT TO CPLR 306-B (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the receipt of a letter by certified mail on January 22, not the receipt of the email with the letter attached on January 17, started the four-month statute of limitations for the Article 78 action. The letter was the final determination of the respondent Department of Health, denying petitioner’s application to open an assisted living facility.  In addition, the Third Department determined a mistake made in the order to show cause, which did not require service upon the respondents, could be remedied. Therefore petitioners should be granted an extension of time to serve respondents pursuant to CPLR 306-b:

There is no dispute that the January 17 letter constituted a final and binding determination. At issue is whether counsel’s receipt of the January 17 email or counsel’s receipt of the January 17 letter by certified mail on January 22, 2019 provided the notice necessary to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. …

We recognize that there is only one letter, the January 17 letter, a copy of which was attached to the January 17 email and the original was delivered by certified mail on January 22, 2019. That said, even though an email delivery could have sufficed, respondents opted to effect delivery of the January 17 letter through the more formal certified mailing process, by which actual delivery and receipt are confirmed with the recipient’s signature. Given that format, it was not necessarily unreasonable for petitioners to have assumed that receipt of the January 17 letter on January 22, 2017 triggered the limitations period or, at least, an ambiguity was created as to whether to measure the time period from that date. As such, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition as untimely … . …

Petitioners submitted, and Supreme Court signed, a proposed order to show cause providing for service upon respondents by service on the Attorney General. Petitioners complied with the terms of that order, but such service was manifestly defective because petitioners were also statutorily required to effect service upon respondents (see CPLR 307, 7804 [c]). In their cross motion, petitioners promptly sought permission to correct this error, and it is evident that respondents were in no way prejudiced. Not to be overlooked is the looming expiration of the statute of limitations. Under such circumstances, rather than dismissing a proceeding, a court is authorized to extend the time for service “upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice” (CPLR 306-b …). Matter of Park Beach Assisted Living, LLC v Zucker, 2020 NY Slip Op 07264, Third Dept 12-3-20

 

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