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THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE TOWN STEMMING FROM THE TOWN JUSTICE’S ISSUANCE OF AN ARREST WARRANT FOR PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the malicious prosecution cause of action against the town should have been dismissed. Plaintiff daughter filed a report accusing her mother of withdrawing money from the daughter’s account without permission. An arrest warrant was issued. Plaintiff thereafter produced a power of attorney allowing her to withdraw money from her daughter’s account and the larceny charge against plaintiff was dropped. Plaintiff then brought a malicious prosecution action against the town and the village:

Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is immune from civil liability for any acts that he or she performs in the exercise of his or her judicial function … .

Defendants correctly observe that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against the Town is premised solely upon the Town Justice signing the warrant authorizing plaintiff’s arrest. The record indisputably establishes that the Town Justice signed the arrest warrant in the exercise of his judicial function. Consequently, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies and Supreme Court should have dismissed the malicious prosecution claim against the Town on that basis … . Gagnon v Village of Cooperstown, N.Y., 2020 NY Slip Op 07256, Third Dept 12-3-20

 

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