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PURPORTED MORTGAGE PAYMENTS MADE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT REVIVE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE PURCHASERS OF THE ENCUMBERED PROPERTY OR THE BANK WHICH ISSUED A MORTGAGE SECURED BY THE ENCUMBERED PROPERTY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined mortgage payments allegedly made after the expiration of the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action did not revive the statute of limitations as against defendants, who purchased the encumbered property, and defendant bank which issued a mortgage secured by the property:

… [T]he tolling or revival effect of partial payments differs as between the payor — the Gureckis — and subsequent purchasers — defendants (see General Obligations Law § 17-107 [2]). [A] qualifying partial payment that is made before the expiration of the statute of limitations will renew the statute of limitations against any subsequent purchaser (see General Obligations Law § 17-107 [2] [2d par] .. ). In contrast, a qualifying partial payment that is made after the expiration of the statute of limitations will only revive the statute of limitations as to a subsequent purchaser who did not give value or who had actual notice of the making of the payment … . Here, … at the time that [the payments] were made the statute of limitations had expired. Given that the record is clear that defendants are purchasers for value and plaintiff put forth no evidence that defendants had actual notice of the … payments, the payments did not have the effect of reviving the statute of limitations as to defendants (see General Obligations Law § 17-107 [2] …). Gurecki v Gurecki, 2020 NY Slip Op 07257, Third Dept 12-3-20

 

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