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DEFENDANT WAS HOUSED HOURS AWAY FROM HIS BROOKLYN ATTORNEY AND ATTEMPTS TO MOVE DEFENDANT TO NEW YORK CITY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH HIS ATTORNEY BEFORE ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA; THE MOTION TO VACATE THE PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller, considering the appeal in the interest of justice, determined defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted. Defendant was housed far away from his Brooklyn attorney and the attempts to have him moved to New York City were ignored by the Department of Corrections. The Second Department held defendant had been deprived of his right to counsel:

Under the circumstances here, and particularly in view of the defendant’s substantiated and uncontradicted testimony that he was deprived of his constitutional right to consult with his attorney in advance of trial, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s application pursuant to CPL 220.60(3) to withdraw his plea of guilty. Under the circumstances … we conclude that the interests of justice would have been better served had the defendant been permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. * * *

This Court has recognized that “[s]imple justice . . . mandates that a plea must be knowingly and intelligently given and, if it be to any degree induced by fear or coercion, it will not be permitted to stand” … . People v Hollmond, 2020 NY Slip Op 07222, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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