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BASED UPON THE LANGUAGE OF THE INSURANCE POLICIES AT ISSUE, THE EXCESS INSURER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT AFTER THE PRIMARY POLICY WAS VOIDED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over two dissenting opinions, interpreted the insurance policies at issue such that the excess insurer was not obligated to pay interest on the underlying personal injury judgment after the primary policy was voided:

This appeal involves a dispute concerning an excess insurer’s obligation to pay interest on an underlying personal injury judgment after the primary policy was voided. Like the courts below, we are unpersuaded by the injured plaintiff’s argument that the excess policy provided overlapping coverage for certain interest payments covered in the primary policy … .

Plaintiff Jin Ming Chen was injured at a construction site and sued the general contractor Kam Cheung Construction, Inc. (Kam Cheung). At the time, Kam Cheung maintained both primary and excess liability insurance policies: a primary policy with a liability limit of $1 million per occurrence from Arch Specialty Insurance Company (Arch) and an excess policy with $4 million per occurrence in coverage from defendant Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (ICSOP). In December 2011, Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff in that action, and, in October 2013, the court entered a personal injury judgment awarding plaintiff $2,330,000 plus $396,933.70 in prejudgment interest. During that time, Arch commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the primary policy due to material misrepresentations made by Kam Cheung in its application, securing a judgment declaring that the Arch Policy was void ab initio. Thus, Arch provided no coverage relating to the personal injury judgment. * * *

Plaintiff effectively asks us to treat interest payments on the underlying award as falling within or reducing the Arch Policy’s $1 million liability limit, which is contrary to the plain language of the Arch Supplementary Payments provision and the ICSOP Policy’s Coverage, Ultimate Net Loss, and Maintenance of Underlying Insurance provisions. To do so would be inconsistent with the language chosen by the parties to the insurance contracts, rendering several clauses forceless—a result that should be avoided …. Arch agreed to expand its coverage of pre- and post-judgment interest beyond its liability limits, and ICSOP agreed to provide coverage only for losses in excess of Arch’s coverage—including both the $1 million Arch policy limit and its Supplementary Payments. Jin Ming Chen v Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 2020 NY Slip Op 06938, Ct App 11-24-20

 

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