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THE BANK’S EVIDENCE OF STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS ALLEGEDLY REVIEWED BY THE AFFIANT; THEREFORE THE EVIDENCE WAS HEARSAY AND THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank’s motion for summary judgment in this foreclosure action should not have been granted because the evidence of standing to bring the action was deficient:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing that it had standing to commence the action. In support of its motion, the plaintiff relied on the affidavit of Elizabeth Gonzales, an employee of the loan servicer. Gonzales averred that the plaintiff had been in possession of the note, which was endorsed in blank, since July 1, 2007, prior to the commencement of the action. Gonzales indicated that she had personal knowledge of the assertions set forth in her affidavit based upon, inter alia, her review of various business records. However, since the plaintiff failed to attach the business records upon which Gonzales relied in her affidavit, her assertions based upon those records constituted inadmissible hearsay … . Moreover, the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the note to the complaint when commencing the action … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Gulati, 2020 NY Slip Op 06754, Second Dept 11-18-20

Similar issues and result in JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Tumelty, 2020 NY Slip Op 06766, Second Dept 11-18-20

 

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