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PLAINTIFF HOME IMPROVEMENT CONTRACTOR DID NOT ALLEGE HE WAS LICENSED IN ROCKLAND COUNTY; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CAUSES OF ACTION TO FORECLOSE ON A MECHANIC’S LIEN AND BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract action brought by defendant home improvement contractor should have been granted because the complaint did not allege plaintiff was licensed as a home improvement contractor:

… [The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, alleging that the parties had cohabited and shared an intimate relationship over a period of approximately two years, and that the plaintiff had performed extensive home improvement contracting work on the defendant’s residence in Rockland County during that period in reliance on the defendant’s promise that he would be reimbursed for the work following the impending sale of the residence. Claiming that the defendant had subsequently reneged on their arrangement, the plaintiff sought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien he had filed against the residence, to recover damages for breach of contract, to recover in quantum meruit, and to impose a constructive trust over the residence. The defendant thereafter moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff was not a licensed home improvement contractor in Rockland County. …

We reject the plaintiff’s contention that the licensing requirement of CPLR 3015(e) did not apply herein. According to the plaintiff’s allegations, he clearly engaged in home improvement contracting work, and he conceded that the cause of action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien could not survive the defendant’s challenge pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) because he was not a licensed home improvement contractor in Rockland County. Moreover, the complaint did not allege that he was duly licensed in Rockland County during the relevant time period (see Code of the County of Rockland, chapter 286, § 3), and the plaintiff never disputed that he did not possess the necessary license. Thus, the causes of action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, to recover damages for breach of contract, and to recover in quantum meruit should have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) … .Cunningham v Nolte, 2020 NY Slip Op 06493, Second Dept 11=12=20

 

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