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IN A VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER CASE, THE STANDARD OF PROOF OF IMPAIRMENT FROM MARIJUANA IS THE SAME AS THE STANDARD OF PROOF OF IMPAIRMENT FROM ALCOHOL (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive opinion by Justice Lynch, affirmed defendant’s conviction stemming from a collision with a motorcycle at a time when defendant was impaired by marijuana (THC). The decision, which lays out the law of vehicular manslaughter, carefully goes through evidence of impairment and causation. The opinion is too detailed to be fairly summarized here. It is worth noting that, on the issue of impairment, the opinion indicates a prior decision describing a different standard of proof of impairment for marijuana, as opposed to alcohol, should no longer be followed. The same standard of proof of impairment is applied to the drugs enumerated in Public Health Law 3306, including marijuana, as is applied to alcohol:

… [T]he degree of impairment necessary to convict a motorist of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree based upon a death that was caused while such motorist was under the influence of one of the drugs enumerated in Public Health Law § 3306 (which includes marihuana) is the same degree of impairment as would be necessary to sustain a conviction of driving while intoxicated by alcohol — namely, the People must prove that such motorist was “incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he [or she was] expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” … . To the extent that this Court’s decision in People v Rossi (163 AD2d 660, 662 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 943 [1990]) can be read as holding that a conviction of vehicular manslaughter in second degree based upon a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4) only requires proof that the motorist was impaired “to any extent,” it should no longer be followed. People v Caden N., 2020 NY Slip Op 05979, Third Dept 10-22-20

 

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