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FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS CONTROLLED BY THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE, NOT THE CONFLICTING PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the provisions in the judgment of divorce, not the separation agreement, controlled father’s child support obligations:

Although the parties entered into a separation agreement directing what the husband was to pay for child support, the subsequent judgment of divorce specifically provided that “the child support obligations of the parties hereto shall be as directed by the [c]orrective [o]rder of [s]upport . . . entered on November 16, 2017.” A conflict therefore exists between the separation agreement and the subsequently entered judgment of divorce. In such circumstance, the judgment of divorce controls … .

Although Family Court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the separation agreement (see Kleila v Kleila, 50 NY2d 277, 282 [1980]), the fact that the corrective order of support was denominated as an order by Family Court or that it emanated from a Family Court proceeding does not mean the terms therein are invalid. The parties voluntarily consented to the terms in the corrective order of support. Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that the parties disputed any of those terms. Under these circumstances, and because the judgment of divorce specifically stated that the parties’ child support obligations were to be determined by the corrective order of support, we are not of the view that Family Court modified the separation agreement. Sherman v Sherman, 2020 NY Slip Op 05993, Third Dept 10-22-20

 

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