You are here: / / FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS CONTROLLED BY THE JUDGMENT OF...
, ,

FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS CONTROLLED BY THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE, NOT THE CONFLICTING PROVISIONS OF THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the provisions in the judgment of divorce, not the separation agreement, controlled father’s child support obligations:

Although the parties entered into a separation agreement directing what the husband was to pay for child support, the subsequent judgment of divorce specifically provided that “the child support obligations of the parties hereto shall be as directed by the [c]orrective [o]rder of [s]upport . . . entered on November 16, 2017.” A conflict therefore exists between the separation agreement and the subsequently entered judgment of divorce. In such circumstance, the judgment of divorce controls … .

Although Family Court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the separation agreement (see Kleila v Kleila, 50 NY2d 277, 282 [1980]), the fact that the corrective order of support was denominated as an order by Family Court or that it emanated from a Family Court proceeding does not mean the terms therein are invalid. The parties voluntarily consented to the terms in the corrective order of support. Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that the parties disputed any of those terms. Under these circumstances, and because the judgment of divorce specifically stated that the parties’ child support obligations were to be determined by the corrective order of support, we are not of the view that Family Court modified the separation agreement. Sherman v Sherman, 2020 NY Slip Op 05993, Third Dept 10-22-20

 

You might also like
THE ORIGINAL CUSTODY ORDER WAS ISSUED IN NEW JERSEY, WHERE FATHER RESIDES; THE NEW YORK CUSTODY ORDER MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE FAMILY COURT DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THE NEW JERSEY COURT AND NO FINDING WAS MADE ON WHETHER NEW JERSEY HAD RELINQUISHED EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OR WHETHER NEW YORK WAS A MORE CONVENIENT FORUM; MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).
No Question of Fact About Whether Defendant Was Strictly Liable for Actions of Dog—Bicyclist Injured When Dog Ran Into Path of Bicycle
ALTHOUGH THE VAPING ASSOCIATION PREVAILED IN ITS ACTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STAYING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH’S REGULATIONS BANNING FLAVORED VAPING LIQUIDS, THE DEPARTMENT’S ACTION WAS “SUBSTANTIALLY JUSTIFIED;” THEREFORE THE VAPING ASSOCIATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (THIRD DEPT).
Victim’s Mother Should Not Have Been Allowed to Speak at Sentencing Because Defendant Convicted Only of Possession of Weapon, Not the Killing of the Victim/Failure to Inform Defendant of Pending Criminal Charges Against Prosecution Witnesses Not Error
A DEFENDANT MAY PLEAD GUILTY TO A CRIME WHICH IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OR FOR WHICH THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS AS LONG AS IT IS SUBJECT TO A LESSER PENALTY THAN THE CHARGED OFFENSE(S) (THIRD DEPT).
PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR A WITNESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).
Competing Expert Affidavits Raised a Question of Fact About Whether the Speed of Defendant’s Vehicle Was a Proximate Cause of the Accident—Plaintiff’s Vehicle Was Struck Broadside by Defendant’s Vehicle When Plaintiff Pulled Into Traffic–Supreme Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendant Reversed
Post-Arrest Exception to Warrant Requirement for Automobile Search Explained

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

LAW OFFICE FAILURE DEEMED AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S... PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS INTOXICATED AND TRESPASSING, WAS INJURED FALLING THROUGH...