New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS INCONSISTENT AFTER IT WAS DEEMED...
Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Negligence

THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS INCONSISTENT AFTER IT WAS DEEMED A DEFENSE VERDICT VIOLATED THE BINDING SUMMARY TRIAL STIPULATION; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined granting the motion to set aside the verdict in this personal injury trial violated the binding summary jury trial stipulation which was entered into pursuant to Richmond County Summary Jury Trial Rules:

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. The parties subsequently entered into a stipulation to submit this matter to a binding summary jury trial pursuant to the Richmond County Summary Jury Trial Rules.

In its verdict sheet, the jury found that the [defendant’s] … negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, but went on to assess her percentage of fault at 49%. The jury did not determine whether the plaintiff had sustained a serious injury and did not award any damages. Upon receiving the jury’s verdict sheet, the Supreme Court informed the jury that “there was no need to go on past” the finding that [defendant’s] negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident, and after ascertaining that all six jurors had signed the form, the trial court dismissed the jurors and announced that “[t]his constitutes a defense verdict.”

Four days later, the plaintiff moved, in effect, to set aside the verdict on the ground that it was internally inconsistent, and the Supreme Court granted the motion.

As the defendants contend, the Supreme Court “exceeded the boundaries of the parties’ agreement by setting aside the verdict” … . Conio v Talarico, 2020 NY Slip Op 05720, Second Dept 10-14-20

 

October 14, 2020
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-10-14 15:37:332020-10-17 15:39:30THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS INCONSISTENT AFTER IT WAS DEEMED A DEFENSE VERDICT VIOLATED THE BINDING SUMMARY TRIAL STIPULATION; THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE, BUT DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A VIOLATION OF JUDICIARY LAW 487 ABSENT AN ALLEGATION OF AN INTENTIONAL DECEPTION (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE FIRST FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, DEFENDANT WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST DURING THE FOUR YEARS UNTIL THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS REFILED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ADD THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF STANDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO PREJUDICE (SECOND DEPT).
CITY WAS NOTIFIED OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM BY A TIMELY NOTICE OF CLAIM FILED BY THE OTHER PARTY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
RESPONDENT, THE CHILDREN’S UNCLE WHO LIVED WITH THE CHILDREN’S FAMILY, WAS A FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A PARENT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEEMED A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILDREN IN THIS SEXUAL ABUSE PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).
Family Court Award of Sole Custody to Mother Reversed, Sole Custody Awarded to Father
THE WIFE’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR ADULTERY IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION, WHICH, IF PROVEN, WOULD HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE HUSBAND, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE HUSBAND AND THE WOMAN WHO WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE WIFE’S ALLEGATIONS SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS DENYING ANY SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP; THE WIFE’S AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ENTIRELY ON PROXIMITY–THE WOMAN WAS THE FAMILY’S BABYSITTER–AND WAS OTHERWISE UNSUPPORTED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILD RETURNED AFTER TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE CHILD HAD BEEN RETURNED AT THE TIME OF THE APPEAL, THE ISSUE IS NOT ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVAL OF A CHILD (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF MAY HAVE ACCEPTED DEFECTIVE GOODS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UCC, THE UCC PROVIDES REMEDIES, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO BE MADE WHOLE AND THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE ACCEPTANCE; PLAINTIFF’S VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DEVIATED FROM THE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING TEMPORARY... PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE...
Scroll to top