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ALTHOUGH VACATING A JUDGMENT STEMMING FROM A CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT MUST ORDINARILY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION, A MOTION TO VACATE IS APPROPRIATE WHERE IT IS ALLEGED THE COURT WHICH ENTERED THE JUDGMENT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; HERE THE MOTION TO VACATE WAS THE CORRECT VEHICLE BUT THE MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED ON THE MERITS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that ordinarily the only way to vacate a judgment entered by the filing of an affidavit of confession of judgment is a plenary action. However, if, as here, the ground for vacating the judgment is the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion to vacate is proper. Here, although the motion was the proper vehicle, the court did have jurisdiction to enter the judgment:

“Generally, a person seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon the filing of an affidavit of confession of judgment must commence a separate plenary action for that relief” … . However, a claim that the court lacked the authority to enter the judgment is an exception to the general rule requiring a plenary action, and may be raised by a motion to vacate … . Thus, the defendants’ contention that the Supreme Court, Westchester County, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a confession of judgment against them was properly raised by way of motion. Nevertheless, the contention is without merit. Pursuant to the version of CPLR 3218(b) applicable at the time the affidavit of confession was filed, “the clerk of the county designated in the affidavit” had authority to enter a judgment by confession against a nonresident defendant (former CPLR 3218[b]). Funding Metrics, LLC v A & A Fabrication & Polishing Corp., 2020 NY Slip Op 05724, Second Dept 10-14-20

 

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