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A COMPONENT OF A TOWER CRANE WAS BEING HOISTED WHEN IT SWUNG TO THE SIDE AND PINNED PLAINTIFF; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action:

The injured plaintiff allegedly was injured in the process of hoisting a component of the tower crane for assembly when the load, which had been stationary for several minutes, suddenly moved, swung to the side, struck the injured plaintiff, and pinned him against a plumber’s pipe. * * *

… [T]he plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action as was predicated upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-8.1(f)(2)(i). The plaintiffs established, prima facie, that the load suddenly moved and caused the injured plaintiff’s injuries (see 12 NYCRR 23-8.1[f][2][i] … ). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as “[t]he fact that the plaintiff may have been the sole witness to the accident does not preclude the award of summary judgment in his favor” … , and “[a]ny comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not preclude liability founded upon a violation of Labor Law § 241(6)” … . Wein v East Side 11th & 28th, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 05085, Second Dept 9-23-20

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