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THE STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE MORTGAGE DEBT WAS DE-ACCELERATED WITHIN THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff bank did not prove the debt had been de-accelerated and therefore did not demonstrate the foreclosure action was not time-barred. It was not demonstrated that the stipulation of discontinuance affirmatively revoked the initial acceleration of the debt:

“A lender may revoke its election to accelerate the mortgage, but it must do so by an affirmative act of revocation occurring during the six-year statute of limitations period subsequent to the initiation of the prior foreclosure action” … .

Here, there is no evidence in the record of any affirmative act of revocation occurring during the six-year statute of limitations period following the initiation of the 2008 foreclosure action … . The only evidence submitted by the plaintiff to establish its affirmative act of revocation was a printout of the Queens County Clerk Minutes, showing that a stipulation of discontinuance and a consent to cancel the lis pendens were filed in the 2008 foreclosure action on July 1, 2013. The plaintiff did not submit a copy of the stipulation of discontinuance. A stipulation of discontinuance will not, by itself, constitute an affirmative act of revocation where the stipulation is silent on the issue of the election to accelerate, and does not otherwise indicate that the plaintiff would accept installment payments from the defendant … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Hussain, 2020 NY Slip Op 04997, Second Dept 9-16-20

 

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