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A 2009 AMENDED COMPLAINT SERVED WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LEAVE OF COURT, ALTHOUGH INVALID AS A PLEADING, RE-ACCELERATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, RENDERING THE ACTION TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the mortgage debt had been re-accelerated by an amended complaint in 2009, rendering the instant foreclosure action time-barred:

… [T]he defendants also submitted the supplemental summons and amended complaint filed on July 13, 2009, in the 2005 action. In the amended complaint, PCG elected to re-accelerate the debt, which started the running of a new six-year period.

The supplemental summons and amended complaint were filed without the required leave of court (see CPLR 3025[b]). However, PCG’s counsel, in an affirmation dated October 9, 2013, submitted with a stipulation to discontinue the 2005 action and a stipulation cancelling the notice of pendency, agreed that the amended complaint, “while arguably insufficient as a pleading, provided that the loan was again accelerated,” and stated that “[t]hus, the loan remains accelerated from July 22, 2009, the date the amended complaint was served up and delivered to [the defendants], as per the corresponding affidavits of service.”

By the submission of these documents, the defendants established that the time in which to sue expired on July 22, 2015, six years after the service of the supplemental summons and amended complaint (see CPLR 213[4]), PCG’s counsel having conceded that the loan was accelerated as of that time. Goshen Mtge., LLC v DePalma, 2020 NY Slip Op 04830, Second Dept 9-2-20

 

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