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PLAINTIFF MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; EVEN THOUGH THE MOTION WAS WITHDRAWN, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s (US Bank’s) motion to dismiss the complaint as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) should not have been granted in this foreclosure action. Plaintiff had moved for an order of reference within one year of defendant’s default but then withdrew the motion:

CPLR 3215(c) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “It is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)” … . “As long as the plaintiff has initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year of the default, there is no basis for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)” … . Moreover, ” the withdrawal of the plaintiff’s motion for an order of reference [does] not demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to initiate proceedings for entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale'” … .

Here, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of US Bank’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it as abandoned, because the plaintiff moved for an order of reference within one year of US Bank’s default … . “In such cases, the complaint should not be dismissed, even if, as here, the plaintiff’s motion is later withdrawn'” … . Bank of Am., N.A. v Wessen, 2020 NY Slip Op 04141, Second Dept 7-22-20

 

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